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12-13 Jul 1945




Tactical Mission REPORT

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CG IAW, 974, R+R, Ed. 6 May 99

Date: MAY 21 1949

Charles L. Schliker Maj USAF



MISSION NO. 263 287
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**HEADQUARTERS
XXI BOMBER COMMAND
APO 234**

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Project Description Date	762.331 12-13 Jul 1945
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FOREWORD

Mission 262 was a mining operation that will be reported in a separate Tactical Mission Report which receives only limited distribution.

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HEADQUARTERS
XXI BOMBER COMMAND
APO 234

TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

Field Order No. 98

Missions No. 263 thru 267.

Targets: Urban Areas of Utsunomiya, Ichinomiya, Tsuruga and Uwajima;
and the Kawasaki Petroleum Center

12/13 July 1945

Table of Contents

	<u>Page No.</u>
Tactical Narrative	1
Annex A - Operations	14
Part I - Navigation Track Chart	15
Part II - Radar Approach Charts	16
Part III - Mean Points of Impact	21
Part IV - Bombing	22
Part V - Flight Engineering Chart	24
Part VI - Radar	25
Part VII - Gunnery	27
Part VIII - Air-Sea Rescue Chart	28
Part IX - Air-Sea Rescue Reports	29
Section A - 58th Wing Report No. 5	29
Section B - 315th Wing Report No. 1	32
Annex B - Weather	37
Part I - Weather Summary	38
Part II - Chart -- Forecast Weather vs. Observed Weather	40
Part III - Prognostic Map	41
Part IV - Synoptic Map	42
Annex C - Communications	43
Part I - RCL	44
Part II - Radio	46
Annex D - Intelligence	49
Part I - Enemy Air Opposition	50
Part II - Enemy Antiaircraft	51
Part III - Damage Assessment	54
Section A - Utsunomiya, Mission No. 263	54
Section B - Ichinomiya, Mission No. 264	56
Section C - Tsuruga, Mission No. 265	58
Section D - Kawasaki Petroleum Center, Mission No. 267	60
Annex E - Consolidated Statistical Summary	63
Annex F - XXI Bomber Command Field Order	73
Annex G - Distribution	80

Prepared By:

A-2 Section
XXI Bomber Command

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HEADQUARTERS
 XXI Bomber Command
 APO 234

SUBJECT: Report of Attacks on 4 Cities and 1 Precision Target on Honshu on 12/13 July, 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington, 25, D.C.

1. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSIONS:

a. Field Order Number 98, Headquarters XXI Bomber Command, dated 12 July 1945, directed the 58th, 73rd, 313th, 314th, and 315th Bombardment Wings to participate in attacks against 4 cities and 1 oil precision target on Honshu in XXI Bomber Command Missions Number 263 through 267.

b. Targets Specified:

(1) Primary Visual and Radar Targets:

<u>Mission Number</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>Wing</u>	<u>Force Assigned</u>
263	Utsunomiya Urban Area (90.13)	58th	4 Groups
264	Ichinomiya Urban Area (90.20)	73rd	4 Groups
265	Tsuruga Urban Area (90.22)	313th	3 Groups
266	Uwajima Urban Area (90.31)	314th	4 Groups
267	Kawasaki Petroleum Center (90.17-128)	315th	70 Aircraft

(2) No secondary or last resort targets were specified.

2. STRATEGY AND PLANS OF OPERATION:

a. Selection of D-Day: These night incendiary missions were a continuation of the plan where the different wings of the Bomber Command were assigned separate cities for attack by night radar bombing methods which had proven successful on recent missions. (For details see Tactical Missions Reports for Missions 234 through 237, 240 through 243, 247 through 250, 251 through 255 and 257 through 261). Another radar precision attack against an oil target (see Tactical Mission Report for missions number 232, 238 and 245 for details of previous attacks) was to be simultaneously executed with these missions. On the basis of a weather prediction presented on 12 July, firm decision was made to attack.

b. Importance of Targets:

(1) Mission Number 263, Utsunomiya: Located 60 miles north of Tokyo in a northern projection of the Kanto plain, Utsunomiya is the capital of Tochigi Prefecture and is the largest city in the plains outside of the Tokyo-Yokohama area. Its population in 1940 was 87,868. Recent photo reconnaissance had shown substantial increases in houses adjoining the new Nakajima Aircraft Company Plant. The city's importance lies in its being a unit in the arc of defenses around Tokyo and a link in the Nakajima Aircraft complex.

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(2) Mission Number 264, Ichinomiya: Important as one of the main "feeder" cities into the Nagoya aircraft center, Ichinomiya is 9 miles northwest of Nagoya on the double track Tokaido main line. Maibara, on the eastern edge of Lake Biwa, is 27 miles west of Ichinomiya. Gifu is 9 miles southeast of it and Kiso Gawa is 4 miles west. Ichinomiya is reported to be a new munitions center and the sub-assembly plants in the city had become more important due to the damage done to Nagoya. It is an old city, with little new housing. The built-up area extends about 1 mile on the east-west axis and 1.2 miles on the north-south extension. The city is built in a spider-like fashion, with roads and railways radiating from a central point. Nikko Gawa encircles the city at the north, but there are no effective fire breaks except for a shrine and the park in the center of the city.

(3) Mission Number 265, Tsuruga: Tsuruga is located 11 miles northwest of the northernmost tip of Biwo Ko, 47 miles northeast of Kyoto on Tsuruga Dan, and has a population of 31,346. It has a built-up area of 1 square mile and the 2 small streams in the city are not considered to be adequate fire breaks. Good landmarks of the city are the breakwaters and Kanoga Saki. Tsuruga is one of the 3 most important of the Korea shuttle ports and is on a cross-island route that ties into the Tokaido main railroad line. The pre-war low capacity traffic has been greatly increased because of shipments which can be made more safely in the Japan Sea. The city is important because in its small compact area it includes a port, warehouses, and railway facilities. A new chemical plant is located to the south.

(4) Mission Number 266, Uwajima: Uwajima is located on Uwajima Bay on the west central coast of Shikoku. It is capable of handling ships up to 1000 tons in good anchorages. The city is also a prominent silk and textile center.

(5) Mission Number 267, Kawasaki Petroleum Center: Located on the Kawasaki waterfront industrial area, the Kawasaki Petroleum Center is on a man-made island of approximately 2300 square feet, located at the approximate center of 14,000 linear feet of industrial water front. This refinery is estimated to be capable of refining up to 2,000,000 barrels of crude oil per year and has storage facilities for over 1,200,000 barrels.

c. Details of Planning--Operational:

(1) Bombing Plans:

(a) Determination of Bomb Load:

1. For Mission 262, the 58th Wing was to load 2 Groups with M-47 incendiary bombs and 2 Groups with 500-pound E-46 aimable clusters containing M-69 incendiary bombs. This load was specified on the basis of efficient utilization of available supplies of incendiary bombs. The bombing accuracy expected indicated that sufficient tonnage would be placed on the target by normal effort of the Wing. The M-47 incendiary bombs were to be placed on the target first in order to saturate the fire defenses and to start appliance fires throughout the area, thereby increasing the expected damage per cluster of the M-69 bombs to be used in the latter stages of the attack. The target area was highly congested and inflammable and it was estimated that a density of 200 tons per square mile on the target area would cause the desired destruction of the mixed residential and industrial structures. The M-69 bombs to be used in the clusters were selected since the penetration required was slight due to the target's high inflammability and large fires could be expected to start shortly thereafter. An intervalometer setting of 75 feet for the bombs and 50 feet

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for the clusters was chosen to get maximum damage on the target area and to attain proper density for each aircraft pattern.

2. For Mission Number 264, the 73rd Wing was instructed to direct a normal effort of 4 Groups carrying clusters containing M-69 bombs to the extent of availability or M-47 incendiary bombs. However, the Wing had no flexibility in determining the bomb load for this mission due to the fact that only M-47 bombs were available for use at this particular time. One hundred per cent use of this bomb against a Japanese urban area had never been made and was normally considered impracticable, since there were insufficient B-7 shackles in any Wing to permit exclusive use of the T-19 cluster adapter. Exclusive use of this bomb with the B-10 shackle was expected to result in excessive hang-ups and malfunctions. The bomb was considered desirable for use against the mixed residential and industrial area to be attacked, due to the high charge and weight ratio of the bomb. The large number of appliance fires anticipated were expected to exact maximum destruction of the area to be attacked. A 75 foot intervalometer spacing was specified to get a bomb density of 225 tons per square mile in the target, sufficient to achieve the destruction desired.

3. For Mission Number 265, since the target area was small and highly congested, consisting chiefly of industrial and warehouse areas, 3 Groups of the 313th Wing, a normal effort, was to attack. One Group was to carry M-47 bombs and 2 Groups were to carry 500-pound incendiary clusters. This was expected to place an average density of approximately 250 tons per square mile of the target area to obtain the maximum destruction. The munitions selected were on the basis of utilization of available supplies and for the characteristics as set forth for the other missions in this series of strikes. Since the target was small and a high concentration was needed for destruction, an intervalometer setting of 50 feet was specified for the M-47 bombs and 35 feet for the clusters to attain the maximum density as well as to insure uniform coverage.

4. For Mission Number 266, the 4 Groups of the 314th Wing were to participate in this normal effort, with 2 Groups carrying M-47 bombs and 2 Groups carrying E-46 500-pound aimable clusters containing M-69 bombs. The target area was relatively small consisting of typical Japanese residential and industrial area type structures, and having several fire breaks. It was planned to put an average density of 200 to 225 tons per square mile on the target, believed to be sufficient to insure destruction of the area. The reasons for the selections of the bombs were the same as those set forth for the other missions. The intervalometer setting specified, 75 feet for the bombs and 50 feet for the clusters, was expected to insure maximum uniform density from the force assigned, as well as to be sufficient to destroy the target area.

5. For each of these 4 incendiary missions the first 12 aircraft airborne, which were to include the 12 best radar crews, were to carry M-47 incendiary bombs and were to precede the main force as pathfinders to mark the target areas.

6. Fuzings were to be instantaneous nose for the M-47 bombs and the clusters were set to open 5000 feet above the target. The instantaneous nose fuzing was to enable the bombs to burst only a few feet beneath the roofs to give maximum spread to the burning napalm in order to increase the ignition of the inflammable buildings as well as their contents. The cluster fuzings was for maximum functioning of both the cluster and the individual bombs after the cluster had opened.

7. For Mission Number 262, all aircraft of the 315th Wing were to carry 500-pound general purpose bombs, fuzed with a 1/10 second delay nose and 1/40 & 1/100 second delay tails. The 500-pound bomb was selected since the target installations were of both the storage and refinery type, and the large number of bomb hits expected to be attained was expected to cause maximum damage to both manufacturing and storage facilities. The 1/40 and 1/100 second delay tail fuze was selected to permit penetration of the bomb beneath the tank tops to a sufficient depth to assure detonation below the contents level and thus causing maximum damage. This delay was also expected to be most effective against the multi-story buildings included in the target area. The 1/10 second delay nose fuze was selected only as an assurance fuze.

(b) Bombing Data: (For pictures of the targets and location of mean points of impact see Annex A, Part III).

1. For Mission Number 263, a mean point of impact near the center of Utsunomiya was selected since a probable circular error of 4000 feet included the whole city.

2. For Mission Number 264, a mean point of impact was selected near the center of Ichinomiya. A probable circular error of 3000 feet included all of the important part of the city's built-up area.

3. For Mission Number 265, the mean point of impact selected for Tsuruga was near the center of the city and a probable circular error of 3000 feet included the entire city.

4. For Mission Number 266, the mean point of impact selected was south of the hill in the center of Uwajima and a probable circular error of 4000 feet included all of the city, with the exception of the northeast extension of the area.

5. For Mission Number 267, the mean point of impact selected was in the center of the Kawasaki Petroleum Center and a probable circular error of 1500 feet included all installations.

6. The missions were similar to other strikes where 4 Wings were assigned separate cities for incendiary night attack using radar methods of bombing and the 315th Wing was assigned a precision target. Determination of axes and altitudes of attack was dependent on the best radar and antiaircraft considerations, which are discussed by those specialists in this report. It was planned to have approximately 550 B-29's take part in these missions and it was anticipated that 3775 tons of bombs would be placed on all targets. Important bombing planning considerations follow:

Wing	Mission Number	Bombing Altitudes (feet)	Axis of Attack (degrees)	Length of Run (miles)	Time of Run (minutes)	Drift (degrees)
58th	263	13,000 to 13,800	286	43	9½	4 right
73rd	264	10,000 to 10,800	80	42	9½	1 right
313th	265	12,000 to 12,800	3	32	7 ¾	8 right

<u>Wing</u>	<u>Mission Number</u>	<u>Bombing Altitudes</u> (feet)	<u>Axis of Attack</u> (degrees)	<u>Length of Run</u> (miles)	<u>Time of Run</u> (minutes)	<u>Drift</u> (degrees)
344th	266	10,000 to 10,800	105	34	7½	3½ left
315th	267	15,000 to 16,000	42	50	11	2½ left

(2) Navigation: The 5 Wings were to use Iwo Jima en route out and on return as per the XXI Bomber Command Tactical Doctrine. From Iwo Jima to the target and return, the route plans were as follows:

(a) Mission Number 263, Utsunomiya:

<u>Route</u>	<u>Reasons for Choice</u>
3545N-14100E	This dead reckoning point east of Choshi Point was selected to keep aircraft out of the Choshi flak area.
to 3623N-14038E (IP)	Initial point was the easily identified mouth of the Mito River on the eastern shore of Honshu.
to Target	A right turn was to be made after the attack.
to 3643N-14043E	This point was designated to keep aircraft on course to land's end and to avoid the flak areas at Hitachi.
to 3600N-14119E	Land's end.

(b) Mission Number 264, Ichinomiya:

<u>Route</u>	<u>Reasons for Choice</u>
3353N-13608E	Landfall was this jutting point of easily identified land at Kinomoto.
to 3458N-13555E	To make the turn onto the target smaller, this point on the lower part of Biwa Ko Bay was designated as a turning point.
to 351230N-1360700E (IP)	The jutting point of land on the eastern side of Biwa Ko which made a good radar approach to the target was selected as Initial Point.
to Target	A right turn was to be made after the attack.
to 3520N-13710E	This point was designated to avoid the flak at Nagoya.
to 343830N-1380400E	This was designated as land's end.

(c) Mission Number 265, Tsuruga:

<u>Route</u>	<u>Reasons for Choice</u>
3354N-13608E	Landfall was this easily identified point on the coast.
to 3512N-13604E (IP)	Okino Shima in Biwa Ko was selected as Initial Point since it was easily identified and provided the best radar approach to the target.
to Target	A right turn was designated off the target.
to 3450N-13636E	After land's end in Nagoya Bay this easily identified point was designated.

(d) Mission Number 266, Uwajima:

Route

3242N-13150E
to
331430N-1314700E
to
332030N-1320100E (IP)
to
Target

Reasons for Choice

This point north of Nobeoka was chosen for landfall.
This point east of Oita was selected for a smaller turn at the initial point.
The easily identified tip of the peninsula jutting out from Shikoku was selected as the initial point for a good approach to the target.
A right turn was designated after the attack and then to land's end.

(e) Mission Number 267, Kawasaki Petroleum Center:

Route

343630N-1385100E
to
3457N-13909E (IP)
to
Target
to
3524N-14024E

Reasons for Choice

Landfall was the easily identified lower point of the peninsula between Tsuruga and Sagami Bay.
The easily identified Kawana Misaki point on the western shore of Sagami Bay that provided for a straight run between landfall and target was selected as initial point.

This point was designated as land's end to take the force over the least defended area of the peninsula.

(3) Flight Engineering:

(a) For Missions Number 263, 264, 265 and 266 the planning was as follows:

1. Altitudes and speeds were planned for maximum fuel economy and safety, as well as for compression of the striking forces.

2. Fuel reserve data indicated that none of the Wings would require bomb bay tanks and that a total fuel load of approximately 6600 gallons would be carried, unless inclement weather would require larger fuel reserves.

3. No maximum or minimum bomb loads were specified. It was anticipated that of the potential capacity of 18,000 pounds per plane for each Wing (with the exception of the 58th Wing whose potential capacity was 16,000 per aircraft) that loads would average approximately 15,000 pounds. The ammunition load was estimated at 300 pounds.

(b) For Mission Number 267 the planning was as follows:

1. Except for the bombing run and the compression of the force, all aircraft were to fly at speeds and altitudes which would allow maximum range and safety. Speeds to be used were to be 5 miles per hour faster than recommended speeds by XXI Bomber Command regulations. No assemblies were planned.

2. It was expected to load full wing and center section tanks and to carry 18,000 pounds of bombs.

(4) Radar:

(a) For Mission Number 263, the planning was as follows:

1. The Radar check points en route to landfall were to be Iwo Jima and its radar beacon and the chain of islands between Iwo Jima and Chosi Point.
2. A reference turn 10 miles east of Chosi Point was selected to avoid antiaircraft defenses in the area and the coast line was expected to be within easy radar range. Landfall and the initial point, the mouth of the Mito River, was a prominent projection along the smooth coast line north of Chosi.

3. Utsunomiya was considered a difficult inland radar target, but the radar return showed up well above 12,000 feet and for that reason the bombing altitude of 13,000 to 13,800 feet was specified. The only good radar approach was upwind and it was directed that direct radar synchronous bombing be used.

(b) For Mission Number 264, the planning was as follows:

1. The only radar check point en route to landfall was Iwo Jima.
2. Landfall was the easily identified point on the peninsula projection at Kinomoto, south of which the coast is smooth and regular.
3. The initial point was the point on the eastern shore of Biwa Ko which had been used successfully on all missions to the Nagoya area.

4. Ichinomiya was considered a difficult inland radar target although there were numerous radar reference points. The only good radar approach was from west to east, whereby the target could be identified from the initial point. The 3 main radar check points formed a triangle, one of which was Gifu and Ogaki, another was a straight line of 3 signals from northwest Nagoya to the target which included industrial areas along the railway line and the last was the return from the wide river west of the target. By utilizing these references the target could be found and bombing could be accomplished by fixed-angle or synchronous radar release.

(c) For Mission Number 265, the planning was as follows:

1. Iwo Jima was the only radar check point between base and landfall.
2. Landfall point was the same as that for Mission Number 264 and the initial point was located on the easily identified distinctive shore of Biwa Ko. By setting up a straight course from landfall to target, good results were anticipated. This was expected to enable aircraft to set up a good course and have bombing data checked prior to synchronization.
3. Tsuruga is located on the coast and has numerous radar reference points to aid bombing. By utilizing the straight approach it was anticipated that there would be more radar releases on the briefed axis and that drift and course could be checked throughout the approach. The coast line northeast of the target and the large chemical plant south of the target were expected to be good radar aids to identify Tsuruga. The target radar return was considered good, although it was expected that there might be some difficulty experienced from the hilly returns between the initial point and the target.

(d) For Mission Number 266, the planning was as follows:

1. Iwo Jima was to be the only radar check point en route to landfall.

2. Landfall was to be made on the distinctive coastal point north of Nobeoka. Radar navigation to the initial point was expected to be good, with the peninsula coast line expected to give good check points for radar fixes and wind runs. The initial point was on the most prominent point in the area, the peninsula on the western coast of Shikoku, and was easily identified by radar.

3. Uvajima was considered to be a difficult radar target. Although reconnaissance routes had been run from the north, south and west, it was decided that a run from the northwest would be best. The hilly terrain and the numerous islands were expected to give a confusing radar picture. Use of an axis from the peninsula tip was to avoid these confusing islands, and Ku-Shima was to be used as a reference point for course determination. The city gives a fair radar return at low ranges, while Ku-Shima could be picked up at the initial point. Direct synchronous release was to be used for bombing.

(e) For Mission Number 267, the planning was as follows:

1. Iwo Jima was to be the first radar check point on which to use the beacon for position determination. The island chain was not expected to be of any assistance since the APQ-7 can only see targets within 30 degrees of heading. The only possible islands that could be utilized for checking would be the Mishino Shima islands.

2. Landfall was expected to be easily identified because it was on the southern tip of the arrowhead-shaped peninsula south of Fuji San. Course for landfall to the target was to be straight, using the prominent coastal point on the above-mentioned peninsula as the initial point.

3. It was planned to use 2 aircraft on this mission to act as radar wind ships to transmit their average wind to all other aircraft. This procedure was expected to set up accurate bombing data prior to landfall. By using a straight course from landfall, all operators were expected to be able to check ground speed and refine the drift. Since the target was built on a series of square jetties of reclaimed land on the coast in Tokyo Bay, the APQ-7 resolves these jetties as separate targets and this was expected to make it easy to pick the exact target location. Direct radar synchronous bombing was to be used for release.

(5) RCM:

(a) For Missions Number 263 through 266, special jamming airplanes were not recommended since the flak was expected to be meager at these 4 urban targets. Electronic jammers were to be installed in each strike aircraft to barrage the 72-84 megacycle and 190-210 megacycle regions. Spot jammers were to be employed to jam any searchlight or gun-laying radars outside the barrage. Rope was to be carried and dispensed in accordance with existing regulations. Search of enemy radar from 20-3000 megacycle was to be continued and enemy communications were to be recorded.

(b) For Mission Number 267, because of the intense flak expected in the target area, it was planned that the 314th Wing would furnish 2 jamming aircraft to cover the 315th Wing strike due to the fact the latter Wing was not yet equipped with jamming equipment.

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The special jamming aircraft were to orbit the position of 3530N-13942E with a radius of 10 miles, 1 at an altitude of 17,000 feet and 17,500 feet for the other. The special jamming aircraft were to be equipped to barrage the 72-84 megacycle and 190-210 megacycle regions and to spot jam any gun-laying or searchlight radars appearing outside the barrage. Rope was to be carried by all strike aircraft to be dispensed when protection was needed from radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns and searchlights.

(6) Air-Sea Rescue: The Navy was furnished with details of these missions and provided the air-sea rescue facilities shown on the chart in Annex A, Part VIII, which also includes facilities provided by the XXI Bomber Command.

d. Details of Planning--Intelligence:

(1) Enemy Air Opposition:

(a) For Mission Number 263, it was anticipated that 10 to 15 fighters might oppose the mission to Utsunomiya with negligible effect.

(b) For Mission Number 264, it was estimated that 15 to 20 interceptors might offer negligible to nil opposition at Ichinomiya.

(c) For Mission Number 265, it was estimated that 10 to 15 fighters might offer nil to negligible opposition at Tsuruga.

(d) For Mission Number 266, it was estimated that 5 to 10 fighters might present nil to negligible opposition at Uwajima.

(e) For Mission Number 267, it was estimated that 40 to 50 fighters might intercept the strike at the Kawasaki Petroleum Center, with 10 to 12 of the planes being twin-engine night fighters. Opposition was expected to be negligible to weak.

(f) The anticipated continued weak showing of the Japanese air force was based on the fact that the enemy had committed a large proportion of its fighters to an anticipated invasion. Another controlling factor was the apparent shortage of aviation gasoline. Although the Japanese have night fighters, they are few and their equipment is far below Allied standards. For that reason night-fighter interception, as well as night fighter day fighter combinations remained weak. Most of the interception was expected to occur in the target area where the B-29's were expected to be silhouetted by fires or searchlights. There was nothing to indicate that the Japanese would employ new tactics. It was assumed that the enemy would be able to warn his defenses 3 to 5 hours prior to landfall by the bombers and that interceptors would meet the B-29's approximately 50 miles out at sea. The diversity of the targets and the anticipated poor operational weather was expected to reduce the opposition listed above.

(2) Enemy Antiaircraft:

(a) For Mission Number 263, it was determined that the Utsunomiya defenses included 20 heavy guns, 86 medium weapons and an estimated 2 to 6 searchlights. This was a moderate, but poor defense against night attack because no searchlights had been noted in the area. The specified attack altitude of 13,000 feet was to avoid other flak areas.

(b) For Mission Number 264, there were no defenses apparent in the immediate vicinity of Ichinomiya, but the airplanes were expected to be within range of the following Nagoya defenses: 12 heavy guns, 23 medium weapons and an estimated 2 to 15 searchlights. The route avoided flak areas, with the exception of the southern tip of Biva Ko, where only meager and inaccurate flak had been encountered on previous missions. At the planned altitude of attack, 10,000 feet, only meager and generally inaccurate anti-aircraft fire was anticipated. A breakaway to the northeast was planned to avoid other defenses in the Nagoya area. The route to land's end was planned to avoid defended areas.

(c) For Mission Number 265, the Tsuruga defenses included 6 and possibly 12 heavy guns, 2 medium weapons and 1 searchlight. This meager defense presented no planning problem. The route avoided heavily defended areas and meager and inaccurate flak was expected on the approach through the Biva Ko area, at Tsu and at Yokkaichi on route to land's end.

(d) For Mission Number 266, photographs of the Uwajima area had pinpointed 6 medium weapons and very meager and inaccurate heavy flak had been encountered on previous missions. The route to the target area was planned to avoid the Oita and Saeki defenses. Flak considerations did not enter into the planning.

(e) For Mission Number 267, in the immediate vicinity of the Kawasaki Petroleum Center the planes would be in range of 128 heavy guns and in addition there were about 30 guns in the Yokosuka area which would be within range. On the approach the planes would pass over the guns of the Hiratsuka defenses. Approximately 50 to 70 searchlights would be effective on the planned approach. It was planned to use rope, desynchronized engines and utilize cloud undercast to decrease searchlight effectiveness. The routes had been determined chiefly on the basis of the best radar approach. To penetrate the Kawasaki dock area, it was difficult to plan a route to avoid flak. The axis of attack was planned as closely as possible to the downwind approach, which was expected to reduce the flak risk. Only fairly accurate flak was expected at the planned altitude of attack, 15,000 to 16,000 feet. On leaving the target area, a breakaway to the right across Tokyo Bay was specified. This would bring the planes within range of 10 heavy guns north of Kisarazu, but this breakaway was necessary to avoid the large flak concentrations in Tokyo.

3. EXECUTION OF THE MISSIONS:

a. Take-Off: Take-off was accomplished in few scattered showers as follows:

Mission	Wing	Pathfinders	Main Force	First Take-off	Last Take-off
263	58th	11	119	120705Z	120840Z
264	73rd	12	118	120905Z	121016Z
265	313th	11	87	120751Z	120915Z
266	314th	12	118	120700Z	120812Z
267	315th		60	120830Z	120900Z
XXI B.C. Totals		46	502*	120700Z	121016Z

* This total does not include 2 weather, 2 RCM, 4 wind-run and 4 Super Dumbo aircraft.

b. Route Out: Long range navigation was accomplished by aircraft proceeding individually to the target areas. A frontal system over the coast line made radar navigation difficult and caused over-runing of the initial point in several instances and hindered compressibility. Only 3 aircraft had excessive navigation errors at landfall.

c. Over Targets: (See Consolidated Statistical Summary, Annex E, for details).

(1) Primary Targets: Target area navigation, wind determination and bombing were accomplished by radar due to the poor weather conditions encountered. Time control showed an improvement over other previous missions. The 73rd Wing accomplished a superior job, putting 99 per cent of its 124 aircraft over its primary target in 70 minutes. The 508 aircraft (including 1 weather and 1 wind-run aircraft) that bombed the primary targets between 1400Z and 1745Z at altitudes ranging from 6000 to 16,700 feet dropped a total of 3578.5 tons of bombs.

(2) Targets of Opportunity: Fourteen aircraft (including 3 that also bombed primary targets) bombed various targets of opportunity with 89 tons of bombs between 1429Z and 1735Z from altitudes between 9900 and 16,000 feet.

(3) Thirty-one aircraft were non-effective on these missions.

d. Route Back: Returns to base were accomplished as briefed, with the exception of 38 aircraft that landed at Iwo Jima.

e. Landing: Aircraft landed in light showers as follows:

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Wing</u>	<u>First Landing</u>	<u>Last Landing</u>
263	58th	122136Z	130055Z
264	73rd	122147Z	130104Z
265	313th	122020Z	122324Z
266	314th	122054Z	130030Z
267	315th	122221Z	130052Z
XXI B. C. Total		122020Z	130104Z

f. Losses: A total of 3 aircraft was lost, 2 to mechanical and accidental factors and 1 to unknown reasons.

g. Operational Summary:

(1) Navigation: See Annex A, Part I, for track charts of all missions.

(2) Bombing: (See Annex A, Part IV, for detailed reports). Bombing results on these missions were considered satisfactory.

(3) Flight Engineering: (See Annex A, Part V, for chart, and Annex E, Consolidated Statistical Summary, for fuel consumption and weight data).

(a) Narrative of Missions as Flown:

1. Cruise to Mainland: Individual climbs were made immediately after take-off to altitudes between 4000 to 8000 feet, where the initial cruise was flown. No assemblies were made. Compression of the forces was effected by varying cruising altitudes and air speeds.

2. Bomb Run: Bombing was conducted by individual aircraft at altitudes between 6,000 and 16,700 feet.

3. Return to Base: Return to base was conducted by individual airplanes without difficulty. Minimum fuel was used by airplanes cruising at 14,000 to 16,000 feet and descending into the traffic pattern. Specified maximum range speeds gave the best fuel consumption.

(b) Comments: No airplanes carried bomb bay tanks. All Wings, except the 315th Wing, carried full loads of bombs. The 315th Wing, carrying general purpose bombs, carried an average of 84 per cent of full load capacity and landed with an average of 1175 gallons of fuel. Twenty per cent of the aircraft airborne by the 58th Wing landed at Iwo Jima due to excessive fuel consumption because of the cold fronts encountered.

(4) Radar: (See Annex A, Part VI, for report on equipment performance). Only 12 aircraft made visual target sightings on these missions.

(5) Gunnery: (See Annex A, Part VII, for report). There was no important gunnery activity during these missions.

(6) Air-Sea Rescue: (See Annex A, Part IX for details). Two aircraft ditched, 1 en route to target and 1 en route to base. Of the 21 crew members, 12 were rescued, 2 were killed and 7 were missing. Another aircraft is missing to unknown reasons, 10 crew members aboard.

h. Weather: (See Annex B, for details). The weather encountered on these missions was approximately as forecast and did not interfere with their performance.

i. Communications:

(1) RCM: (See Annex C, Part I, for details). Twenty-nine RCM Observers took part in these missions.

(2) Radio: (See Annex C, Part II, for details). Thirty-nine strike reports were transmitted and received during these missions.

j. Intelligence Summary:

(1) Enemy Air Opposition: (See Annex D, Part I, for details). Air opposition was negligible on these missions, only 2 attacks being made by the 67 enemy aircraft sighted.

(2) Enemy Antiaircraft: (See Annex D, Part II, for details). Flak was heavy, meager and inaccurate, with no bombers sustaining damage.



(3) Damage Assessment: (See Annex D, Part III, for details).

(a) Mission Number 263, Utsunomiya: A total of .94 square miles (34.2 per cent of the built-up area) was destroyed. Four unnumbered targets were damaged.

(b) Mission Number 264, Ichinomiya: Damage to this target was .01 square mile (.8 per cent of the built-up area). One unnumbered target was damaged.

(c) Mission Number 265, Tsuruga: A total of .77 square mile (68 per cent of the built-up area) was destroyed. Two numbered targets and 1 unnumbered target were damaged.

(d) Mission Number 266, Uwajima: No photo reconnaissance was available on the damage to this target by this strike. Damage assessment to Uwajima will be included in the Tactical Mission Report for Missions 297 through 302, to be issued in the near future.

(e) Mission Number 267, Kawasaki Petroleum Center: Damage was scattered, with 6 per cent of the storage capacity being damaged. Thirty-seven specific units were damaged, including 7 adjacent numbered targets.

Curtis E. LeMay
CURTIS E. LEMAY
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding

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ANNEX

A

OPERATIONS

Part I - Navigation Track Chart

Part II - Radar Approach Charts

Part III - Mean Points of Impact

Part IV - Bombing

Part V - Flight Engineering Chart

Part VI - Radar

Part VII - Gunnery

Part VIII - Air-Sea Rescue Chart


Part IX - Air-Sea Rescue Reports

Section A - 58th Wing Report No. 5

Section B - 315th Wing Report No. 1

Missions No. 263, 264, 265, 266 and 267




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



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
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
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
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
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
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APPROACHES TO UTSUNOMIYA
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
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
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

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

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
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

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
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APPROACHES TO ICHINOMIYA
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
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

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
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

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

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

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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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



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


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


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



APPROACHES TO UWAJIMA
ACTUAL SCOPE PHOTOS
ALTITUDE 10,000 FEET

PART III
MEAN POINTS OF IMPACT



PART III
MEAN POINTS OF IMPACT



PART IV - BOMBING

1. Mission No. 263, Utsunomiya Urban Area:

a. The greatest difficulty encountered was a ten-tenths undercast in the target area. Almost all bombing was accomplished by radar and DR navigation. In all cases where radar was operative, the radar-bombsight coordination synchronization procedure was used.

b. The wing dispatched a weather plane ahead of the main force to obtain and transmit wind direction and velocity to the main force. The practice of dispatching a weather ship ahead of the main force is considered highly satisfactory and a great aid to bombing aircraft.

c. Malfunction of bombing equipment occurred in 5 aircraft. One aircraft reported malfunction of bomb bay doors, 2 aircraft reported malfunction of B-10 shackles and 2 aircraft encountered malfunction of unknown cause.

d. The mission was well planned from a bombing standpoint and no difficulty was encountered in executing the plan, except for weather in the target area. The IP and axis of attack were highly satisfactory.

e. Compressibility of this wing was 140 minutes. The average drift reported was 7 degrees right.

2. Mission No. 264, Ichinomiya Urban Area:

a. The target area was ten-tenths undercast which permitted only 8 visual sightings. Some difficulty was encountered in identifying the target with radar, because the target was small. The wind obtained by the weather aircraft was accurate and considered a great aid to the aircraft of the main force. Several aircraft reported malfunction of bombing equipment as follows: bomb doors, 1; B-10 shackles, 1; unknown, 2; A-4 release, 2; and T-19 adapter, 3. The bombing was accomplished with radar performing the principal sighting operation.

b. Three aircraft bombed targets of opportunity (1 of which also bombed the primary target) within the empire. The 2 aircraft that bombed only targets of opportunity did so due to engine failures.

c. The mission was considered well planned from the bombing standpoint. The average drift reported was 1 degree left. The compressibility was very poor and was attributed to adverse weather conditions on route to the target. Compressibility was 112 minutes.

3. Mission No. 265, Tsuruga Urban Area:

a. Bombing was accomplished by radar and dead reckoning navigation, as weather in the target area was ten-tenths undercast.

b. The greatest difficulty encountered was a weather front in the target area and a wind shift during the latter part of the striking period, contrary to the wind obtained by the weather ship. Two aircraft bombed targets of opportunity when mechanical difficulties were encountered which prevented them from reaching the primary target. Five aircraft reported malfunction of bombing equipment as follows: B-10 shackles, 3; A-4 release, 1, and intervalometer, 1.

c. The mission was considered well planned from a bombing standpoint. The average drift reported was 6 degrees right. Compressibility for the wing was 127 minutes.

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4. Mission No. 266, Uwajima Urban Area:

a. All bombing was accomplished by radar as the target area was ten-tenths undercast. Severe weather was encountered at the target and many aircraft bombed under instrument conditions.

b. The greatest difficulty encountered was a weather front lying over the target area which made it very difficult to obtain accurate winds. The aircraft dispatched to obtain wind direction and velocity proved to be very beneficial.

c. Nine aircraft reported malfunction of bombing equipment as follows: B-10 shackles, 4; A-4 release, 2, and bomb racks, 3.

d. The mission was considered well planned from a bombing standpoint. The average drift reported was 3 degrees left. Compressibility for the wing was 133 minutes.

5. Mission No. 267, Kawasaki Tetrolowa Center:

a. Bombing was accomplished by radar, except for 3 aircraft that bombed visually when their radar sets became inoperative.

b. One aircraft reported malfunction of bomb doors.

c. The greatest difficulty encountered was the inoperative radar reported by the aircraft.

d. The average drift reported was 2° right. Compressibility for the wing was 73 minutes.

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
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FLIGHT ENGINEERING



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PART VI - RADAR

1. Equipment Performance - WQ-13:
 - a. Number of sets operative at take-off: 466 (86½%).
 - b. Number of sets operative over target: 437
 - c. Number of sets operative on landing: 431
 - d. Number of planes using azimuth stabilization: 337 (77.1%)
 - e. Number of set failures: 2
 - f. Interference was encountered at target area, IF and land-fall. This was due to the weather at these points.
 - g. Average maximum range (in nautical miles) of targets:
 - 70 at 5000 to 10,000 ft
 - 66 at 10,000 to 15,000 ft
 - h. Average maximum range (in nautical miles) of beacon:
 - 120 at 5000 to 10,000 ft
 - 132 at 10,000 to 15,000 ft

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i. Average maximum range of Japanese Coast - 45 nautical miles.

j. Remarks:

(1) Briefing material was good with the exception that the 73rd Wing stated the radar strip was of little value and was supplemented by 2 additional short range pictures from their files.

(2) Methods of release:

(a) Radar direct non-synchronous

(b) Radar direct synchronous.

2. Radar Bombing - AN/APQ-7:

a. Number of sets operative at take-off: 54

b. Number of sets operative over target: 54

c. Number of sets operative on return: 52

d. Average Maximum range (in nautical miles):

50 at 15,000 ft
100 at 10,000 ft

e. Interference: Weather and other APQ-7 sets.

f. Coast of Japan was picked up at 50 nautical miles.

g. Equipment failures: 2

h. Remarks:

(1) 50 individual synchronous radar releases; 2 visual releases.

(2) Landfall was easily identified but some operators had difficulty with the LP.

(3) Briefing was satisfactory.

(4) Aiming points were difficult to pick-up until at close range.

3. Loran - APN-4 and APN-9:

a. Number of fixes reported: 3478

b. Antenna used and usable maximum range:

	<u>Fixed</u>	<u>Trailing</u>	<u>Command</u>
(1) Ground-Wave	475	618	410
(2) Sky-Wave	1200	1345	1330

c. Inoperative sets: 16

4. IFF - SCR-695:

a. Sets turned on and off as per SOP.

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b. Number of time checked: 32 times.

c. 1 Malfunction, due to burned out transmitter, no signal given out.

5. Absolute Altimeter - SCR 714:

a. Number of operative sets: 216.

b. Number of inoperative sets: 2.

PART VII - GUNNERY

1. No. of A/C firing: None.

2. Average turret load:

<u>UF</u>	<u>U₂</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>L₁</u>	<u>LF</u>
400	388.3	400	325	300

3. Average no. of rounds fired in combat per turret:

<u>UF</u>	<u>U₂</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>L₁</u>	<u>LF</u>
0	0	0	0	0

4. No. of rounds fired in combat: 0

5. No. of rounds used for test firing: 3670. Average per gun: 3.3.

6. Guns Loaded:

<u>58th Wing</u>	<u>73rd Wing</u>	<u>313th Wing</u>	<u>314th Wing</u>	<u>315th Wing</u>
Hot	Cold	Hot	Hot	Cold

7. Malfunctions: C.F.C.
1 Rheostat out

8. Total percentage of equipment operative:

<u>C.F.C.</u>	<u>C.L.</u>
99.9%	50 M.G. 100% (none used)

9. Remarks: There was no gunnery activity on these missions.

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
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APRIL 1945

PART VIII AIR SEA RESCUE CHART

MISSION NO 263-267
DATE 12-13 JULY '45
XXI BOMCOM.



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PART IX - SECTION A - DITCHING REPORT*

1. Mission No. 263, 12-13 July 45. Date of Report: 19 July 45.
2. Wing: 58th Group: 468th Squadron: 792nd Plane No: 42-24855.
3. Cause of Ditching: Fuel transfer system out preventing transfer of fuel from No. 1 which was feathered.
4. Time of Ditching: 2155Z, 13 July 1945. Location: 1837N-14412E.
5. Crew:

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Last Seen</u>
P	IRVIN A. STAVIN	1st Lt	Rescued
CP	EDWARD M. MARANTETTE	2nd Lt	Rescued
N	RICHARD B. LACROSSE	2nd Lt	Rescued
B	DONALD J. PASQUARIELLO	2nd Lt	Rescued
FE	Robert M. Fatchhouse	Sgt	Rescued
V	WALTER J. BIELSKI	2nd Lt	Rescued
R	Frank V. Ortiz, Jr.	Sgt	Rescued
SG	Robert E. Silcox	Sgt	Rescued
LG	William H. Pearce	Cpl	Drowned
RG	Bruce S. Galbraith	Cpl	Rescued
TG	William A. Teague	Cpl	Drowned

6. Narrative Report:

a. Prior to Ditching: Over Iwo at 0528 aircraft had 1549 gallons of fuel on board with contact conditions at Tinian. About 2½ hours out of Iwo the engineer noted that #1 was low on fuel and 300 gallons were transferred from #1, 2 and 3 tanks into #1. It was then noticed that #1 was using excessive fuel and shortly thereafter #1 started backfiring and smoking. #1 was feathered, then the fuel transfer system failed when the engineer was attempting to transfer the fuel from #1 into the remaining good engines. 450 gallons of fuel remained available for the three good engines. It was determined that aircraft had insufficient available fuel to reach base and when a convoy was sighted pilot decided to ditch near convoy.

b. Preparation for ditching:

(1) Pilot established contact with dumbco on VHF and dumbco was on scene at the time of ditching. Radio operator did not attempt to contact ASR facilities or Wing Ground Station.

(2) No equipment was jettisoned due to faulty bomb bay doors. Loose equipment was thrown into bomb bay. Ditching braces were installed with some difficulty owing to poor condition of the securing bolts. Astrodome and all escape hatches were opened prior to ditching.

c. Ditching - Personnel:

(1) The pilot and co-pilot were in their seats with safety belts and shoulder harnesses fastened.

(2) The navigator assumed ditching position under his table facing aft and using parachute for padding.

* Based on 58th Wing Air-Sea Rescue Report No. 5.

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(3) The bombardier assumed ditching position along side of the engineer. No safety belt was available for his use but he improvised his own.

(4) The flight engineer remained in his seat with hands braced against the engineer's panel.

(5) The radio operator remained in his seat facing aft with back braced against upper forward turret.

(6) The CFC Gunner took a position at the aft side of the lower forward turret with back braced against upper forward turret using parachute for padding and feet braced against pressure bulkhead door.

(7) The right and left gunners and the radar operator assumed positions against the after pressure bulkhead in the rear unpressurized compartment.

(8) The tail gunner remained in the tail gunner's compartment.

d. Ditching Aircraft:

Descent was made from 4000 feet with $\frac{1}{2}$ flaps. Approach was made at 120 MPH slightly cross wind and parallel with the swells which were about six feet high and about 20 feet from crest to crest. Speed at impact was 95-100 MPH. Landing was made on the crest of a swell, nose up about 5°. Four slight impacts were felt before the final impact which was violent. Right wing hit crest of swell causing aircraft to swerve violently to the right. Fuselage broke just aft of the wing and rear section sank in less than one minute. Forward section floated nose down, with trailing edge of wing above water, for about two minutes.

e. Escape:

(1) The pilot was knocked unconscious by impact but regained consciousness as soon as water entered the forward compartment. He unfastened his safety belt and left through the pilot's window. Pilot estimates that the nose was under twenty feet of water when he escaped.

(2) Co-pilot escaped through the co-pilot's window.

(3) The bombardier was thrown forward by the impact and followed the engineer through the engineer's hatch.

(4) The CFC Gunner, radio operator and navigator left through the astrodome.

(5) The right and left gunners and radar man left through the rear escape hatch.

(6) The tail gunner escaped through the tail gunner's escape hatch.

(7) All Mae Wests functioned normally but some difficulty was experienced due to improper fitting of Mae West.

(8) The A-3 life rafts were released from the inside. Both rafts functioned normally. Two additional rafts were dropped by the Dumbo. All rafts were recovered but some difficulty was experienced in boarding the rafts while wearing inflated Mae Wests. The CFC Gunner



had a C-1 raft but when difficulty was experienced in getting the raft out of the pocket it was abandoned. All crew members except the left gunner and tail gunner got into the large rafts. The left gunner and tail gunner were panicky and were seen struggling in the water with Mae West inflated but making no progress toward rafts. It is believed by the surviving crew members that the left gunner and tail gunner were pulled under by debris as the plane sank or slipped out of their Mae Wests which were improperly fitted as per instructions received at Topeka, Kansas.

f. Survival:

No rationing was instituted due to the immediate presence of the convoy. Survivors were in the water only about 30 minutes before being picked up by the FC 1551 and LSM 345.

g. Weather:

Wind 8 knots from 120°. Ceiling 2000' scattered cumulus. Visibility unrestricted. Swells about 6' deep and 20' between crests. Sea was moderately choppy.

h. Rescue:

A dumbo was circling at the time of ditching. All survivors were picked up in 30 minutes by a sub chaser and LSM from the convoy.

7. Suggestions of the Crew:

a. CFC Gunner believes that tunnel is better ditching position than against turret because he was tossed around when aircraft slowed around. Also suggests that bombardier take position beside him in tunnel.

b. Bombardier's position unsatisfactory. He devised a belt to hold himself in position but this failed to help and he was thrown forward.

c. Proper instruction in tight fitting of the Mae West and wet dinghy drill should be given at Topeka and other training stations in the Continental United States. (Note this was a new crew very recently reported in from the States. Most of the crew had had no wet dinghy drill prior to this mission.)

8. Action taken by Wing:

a. B-15 Emergency Belts previously ordered have not arrived. Groups have been instructed to manufacture belts locally.

b. Wet dinghy drill for all new crews will be mandatory with-in the Wing prior to new crews going on their first mission.

9. Comments: This crew did a good job of ditching the aircraft as evidenced by the fact that all 11 crew members were alive after landing had been effected. Loss of the left gunner and tail gunner appears due to lack of familiarity with equipment and insufficient wet dinghy training.

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PART IX - SECTION B - DITCHING REPORT*

1. Wing: 315th Group: 16th Squadron: 16th B-29 Aircraft No. 42-63603.
2. Mission Number: 267, 12 July 1945.
3. Cause of Bailout: Three runaway propellers, engines #1, 3 and 4.
4. Time and Position of Bailout: 1934K, 12 July 1945, approximately 80 miles North of western tip of Orote Peninsula, Guam. Coordinates: 1436N - 14425E.
5. Rescue: 13 July 1945. Two crew members by LCI 947 at 0205K and 0430K; one by LCI 603 at 0746K.
6. Crew:

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>Last Seen</u>
AC	MILFORD A. BERRY	1st Lt	0531337	In Airplane
F	JAMES TRIVETTE, SR	2nd Lt	02069867	Rescued
N	K. WARREN ROLLINS	1st Lt	0738889	Bailing Out
B	REX E. WERRING, JR.	1st Lt	0732474	Rescued
VO	IRVING W. AMERINGER	2nd Lt	02068825	Bailing Out
FE	Morton Finkelstein	Sgt	32977132	Bailing Out
RO	Robert E. Lynch	Sgt	16135884	Bailing Out
RS	Harold I. Schaeffer	S/Sgt	15068491	In Airplane
LS	Clarence N. Nelson	Sgt	13188055	Rescued
TG	Philip G. Tripp	Sgt	31428556	Killed

7. Narrative Report:

a. History of Trouble: The aircraft acted properly during take-off (1904K) and climb. After leveling off at 6200 ft., RPM was reduced but No. 1 remained at 2400. The Airplane Commander reduced the RPM of No. 1 to 2000 with the feathering button. Almost immediately, however, it increased and went wild. The Airplane Commander hit the feathering button but it had no effect, so he pulled the throttle back, told the Bombardier to salvo the bombs and headed for Guam. On the turn, No. 3 started building up and again the feathering button was ineffective. The Airplane Commander gave the order to prepare to ditch. Almost immediately, No. 4 ran away and the order to bail out was given. The altitude was about 4500 feet, and the aircraft was dropping at about 1000 ft per minute. The Pilot took over the plane while the Airplane Commander fastened his parachute and one man life raft. The Pilot rang the alarm bell and called the left scanner and tail gunner on interphone.

b. Preparation for Bailout: The bombs had been salvaged and the doors closed. Each man fastened his parachute and hooked on his C-2 raft. The Bombardier opened the bomb bay doors. The pressure bulkhead was opened by the Radar Operator or Navigator.

c. Radio Procedure: The Airplane Commander attempted to transmit on VHF, channel C, but it appeared to be dead. He then switched to channel A. Bombardier reported that Pilot was not getting out on this channel. Also, no word has been received of receipt of any message by any aircraft or ground station.

* Based on 315th Wing Air-Sea Rescue Report No. 1.



d. Bail Out:

(1) Exit through Forward Bomb Bay.

The Navigator and Radar Operator went out first (order unknown), and their chutes were seen to open by the Bombardier who was third out. The Radio Operator hesitated but left sometime between the time the Bombardier and Pilot bailed out. The Pilot was next out and saw one chute open just before he left the airplane. With the exception of the Airplane Commander, the front of the airplane was clear when he left, and the altimeter indicated 500 feet. No difficulty was experienced in leaving the hatch. The Bombardier and Pilot put their hands along the edge of the bulkhead door and dove out in one motion.

(2) Exit through Rear Bomb Bay.

The Right Scanner had been briefed to bail out first and was fully geared and ready to go. The Left Scanner motioned him out but he (Right Scanner) "looked blank". The Left Scanner then asked him to step aside so he (Left Scanner) could go out, thinking that so doing the Right Scanner might gain confidence. The Right Scanner stepped aside, still mute, and the Left Scanner dove out the pressure bulkhead door. The Right Scanner was never seen to leave the airplane.

(3) Altitude and time for Bailout: Between 1500 ft and 500 ft. Time interval approximately 1 1/2 minutes between first and last man.

e. Survival:

(1) Lt. Trivette:

(a) There was no shock felt on opening of the chute. He hit the water almost immediately after pulling the rip cord, hit the quick release button and escaped easily from the parachute. The harness and dinghy started to float away (the parachute had not collapsed and apparently the snap lanyard had not been hooked to the life vest). He kicked off his shoes and swam after the parachute.

(b) During this interval he saw a flash on the horizon when the airplane blew up. After a while two planes circled over him and he felt for the flares normally carried in the pocket of the summer flying suit. They were missing. (Lt. Trivette stated they were placed in the pocket, but he was not sure the pocket was buttoned.) Three individual 2 star flares were fired in a triangle around him.

(c) The sea became rougher and began to brook over his head, so he went after the dinghy which was still attached to the parachute and was submerged. He gathered the shroud lines in his hand and went down, hand under hand after the raft, retrieving it on the third attempt. Lt. Trivette looked for a wheel to turn to inflate the raft and, not finding any, was somewhat confused, finally pulling on a loose string. This turned out to be the rip cord of the lever type valve and the raft inflated. No difficulty was experienced entering the raft. He attempted to bail out the raft but after working some time gave it up as water splashed in as rapidly as it could be removed.

(d) Soon, an airplane started to circle and he looked for the flares in the raft. The airplane passed before he found the flare but he was ready and shot a flare the next time it came over. He removed the cap and had some difficulty firing the flare due to lack of familiarity with it. Finally he felt the ring, pulled it and the flare functioned normally. He saw a search light with a green filter on the horizon



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and fired another flare. Soon he saw a ship outlined on the horizon and fired a flare just as it was about to run him down. The ship stood by and picked him up.

(2) Lt. Werring:

(a) Lt. Werring did not experience any opening shock. Upon hitting the water he inflated his Mae West (no recollection of getting out of the harness) and retrieved his dinghy. About that time he saw the airplane explode about 50-200 feet above the water in a wing down attitude. He heard the Navigator call for help and could hear him coughing. Lt. Werring tried to swim in that direction and drag his dinghy with him but had little success. He then went about inflating the dinghy and like Lt. Trivette looked for a wheel valve. He finally "grabbed a handful of string", and inflated the raft. He saw one flare (2 star-red) go off in what seemed to be the opposite direction from where the airplane went down but was not certain of the direction.

(b) While attempting to get in the raft an airplane circled overhead but he couldn't get flares to signal it. He took some flares from his pocket and shot one off just as the airplane passed on a return run. The plane turned and Lt. Werring shot another flare and a couple of tracers. The plane dropped a surface flare about 15 yards from the raft and blinked his recognition lights. All in all the plane dropped 3 surface flares. It circled once more and then took off. (The airplane orbiting above the raft had engine trouble and had to return to base.)

(c) Lt. Werring became ill, dozed off, and sometime later was awakened by a plane overhead. After two misfires he got one tracer off. There were quite a few planes searching with landing lights on. A small ship came by, running without lights except one small one on the bow. He yelled but was not heard. He then started looking for signal equipment on the dinghy but was under the impression the rafts did not contain any, so after only a short search he gave up. (Each C-2 raft contains two Mark 1, Mod 0 and two M-75 distress signals or four M-75 signals if the M-1, Mod 0 is not available.) He attempted to bail out the raft but found the bailing bucket ineffective.

(d) Some time later an LCI started turning in his direction with search lights on. Lt. Werring paddled toward the ship, finally got in the beam and was picked up.

(3) Sgt Nelson:

(a) The parachute opening shock was negligible and almost immediately afterwards Sgt. Nelson hit the water. Escape from the parachute was accomplished without difficulty but the snap lanyard of the one-man life raft was not hooked and the raft was irretrievably lost. His flares were lost from his pocket and the only night signal available was tracer ammunition.

(b) During the night Sgt. Nelson saw several aircraft circle nearby and fired tracer ammunition to no apparent avail. Surface vessels were searching nearby with search lights playing but he was unable to attract their attention or get in the beam. At one time he saw four flares (2 star-red) in as many distinct locations.

(c) In the morning an airplane returning from the raid passed overhead and Sgt. Nelson broke out his sea marker dye. Another B-29 was seen to pass and then a Dumbo spotted him. The Dumbo dropped a "sea marker bomb" and led the LCI to Sgt. Nelson.